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The Impact of Sports Teams and 
Facilities on Neighborhood 




Among the noteworthy twentieth century trends identified for the
United States has been the movement of people and economic activity
from urban centers to the suburbs.  Business has followed the migra-
tion of its labor force, and as a consequence most American city cen-
ters have deteriorated economically and socially in the latter years of
this century.  This urban economic malaise was further exacerbated in
the 1980s by President Ronald Reagan’s vision of a nation less depen-
dent on a federal government.  One manifestation of Reagan’s empha-
sis on greater state autonomy was reduced federal revenue sharing.  A
less generous federal government translated into more parsimonious
state governments, and, following the dollar food chain, less financial
support for local governments.  The erosion of the urban economic
base compelled new economic strategies for cities, and mayors have
responded by devising policies that emphasize the urban core as a cul-
tural destination.  Mayors hope that their cultural entrepreneurship will
reverse the decades-old flow of people and money from city centers
and serve to reestablish them as the hubs of American life.  One aspect
of this strategy has been the aggressive attempt by the mayors of many
large cities to relocate professional sports stadiums from the suburbs to
the central business districts (CBDs).  The purpose of this study is to
use the city of Seattle as a case study through which to analyze the
prospects for improving economic performance in city centers by relo-
cating stadiums used for professional sports to the CBD.
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In addressing this issue, it is important to establish first the inci-
dence of stadium migration from the suburbs back to the city center
and to discuss the reasons for this development.  In the next section of
this study, the hypothesized microeconomic impact is contrasted with
the macroeconomic or metropolitan impact.  Scholars have studied the
macroeconomic impact sufficiently so that reliable evidence is avail-
able on the influence professional sports have exerted on metropolitan
areas.  There are reasons, however, to expect that in terms of both mag-
nitude and pattern, economic development at the local level may differ
from that characterizing the metropolis.  The next portion of the paper
is devoted to discussing Seattle’s use as a representative sample for
exploring the likely economic impact of CBD relocation.  Essential to
this task is a brief discussion of Seattle’s recent stadium history from
the construction of the Kingdome to the present.  The economic effect
the Kingdome has had on the Pioneer Square Neighborhood, that por-
tion of Seattle that borders the Kingdome on the West and North, is
portrayed in the paper’s next section.  Critical to this analysis is a busi-
ness survey largely conducted at the end of June 1998.  Conclusions
and policy implications are offered in the paper’s final part.
STADIUM MIGRATION—BACK TO THE FUTURE
Earlier in the 20th century, stadiums were woven into dense urban
fabrics.  Rather than the stadium defining and shaping an area, the sta-
dium was viewed as subordinate to a larger urban design and function.
The existing city grid established the shape and location of many urban
ballparks lending an idiosyncratic character to many of them.  For
example the Baker Bowl, home to the Major League Baseball’s Phila-
delphia Phillies until 1938, was also known as “Hump” because it was
built on an elevated piece of ground to accommodate a railroad tunnel
running under centerfield (Lowry 1992).  Today only Fenway Park in
Boston (1912) with its legendary “Green Monster” and Wrigley Field
in Chicago (1914) stand as representative monuments to past urban
imperatives.  Tiger Stadium in Detroit (1912) was recently replaced by
a new ballpark, and discussions are under way to replace both Fenway
Park and Wrigley Field.  
The Economics of Sports 23
In the post–World War II era, a rapidly expanding economy
increased the personal incomes of most Americans to a point where
former luxuries such as automobiles and houses outside crowded cities
could be purchased by a majority of the population.  As areas on the
city’s periphery were settled, businesses followed in part to capitalize
on emerging markets for consumer goods and to gain proximity to the
labor force.  In keeping with this suburban trend, stadiums followed the
fans.  Expressways were built to accommodate the automobile, and
suburban stadiums were located in close proximity to expressways to
facilitate fan travel to the ballpark.   Automobiles required space, and
the typical suburban ballpark was surrounded by a sea of asphalt.  The
homes of most fans in the post–World War II era were connected to the
ballpark by a seamless stream of concrete.
Accommodating the automobile came at a price from the perspec-
tive of the neighborhood in which the stadium was located.  Easing
entry and egress to the stadium mitigated the spillover of pedestrian
traffic and economic activity into the environs where the ballpark was
located.  On the way from the stadium to their automobiles, fans
encountered car windows not store windows.  Once in their cars, the
strong current of the expressways did not allow easy contact with com-
mercial entities along the way.  Any commerce that did occur in con-
junction with sports spectating likely did so within the confines of the
ballpark unless excursions into the neighborhood or elsewhere were
planned.
Professional sports has been undergoing an economic revolution
inspired by a confluence of circumstances both inside and outside the
professional sports industry.  These changes have affected both the
supply and demand for professional sports, which, in turn, have had
implications for where and how professional sporting events are pack-
aged and presented.  Nowhere are these changes more apparent than in
the design and location of stadiums and arenas.  Financial imperatives
have worked to all but eliminate the multipurpose, circular stadium
(the “ashtrays”) built a few decades ago in cities such as Cincinnati,
Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia to host both football and baseball.  In
addition, financial forces have reversed the trend toward locating ball-
parks in suburban areas with vast tracts of land suitable for inexpensive
parking.  Stadiums and arenas are coming back to the cities with prom-
ises of fan spending spilling over into the commercial corridors of the
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neighborhoods through which fans flow to reach transportation centers
or remote parking lots.
Cities have used this promise of increased economic activity to
persuade citizens to lend financial support to an aggressive city strat-
egy to remake their centers into cultural destinations.  For example, to
lure people back to the downtown, Cleveland has developed the Gate-
way complex, which serves as a home to the Major League Baseball
(MLB) Indians (Jacobs Field) and the National Basketball Association
(NBA) Cavaliers (Gund Arena) along with the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame.  Atlanta, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Nashville,
to name but a few, are other cities that have opted for placing stadiums
in or near the central business district (CBD) in an effort to help revi-
talize them.  Stadium construction in the National Football League
(NFL) symbolizes the return to downtown or near downtown locations.
Barring unforeseen construction delays, 13 new stadiums will have
been built in the 1990s.  Of those, only facilities in Jacksonville (the
renovation was of a scope sufficient to warrant it new), San Francisco,
Tampa Bay, and Maryland (Washington Redskins) are located outside
of what could be considered the CBD or CBD fringe.  Approximately
60 percent of the NFL stadiums were located in or near CBDs prior to
the 1990s, or about 16 percent less than characterize current construc-
tion trends.  If the events conducted at the stadiums attract people from
beyond the metropolitan areas in which they are located, then those
who support public subsidies for these facilities promise that metropol-
itan, state, and regional economies will benefit from such investments.
Do metropolitan economies derive a boost from professional sports
and their stadiums?  If they do, then surely the neighborhood in which
the stadium is located is the recipient of those benefits.  In the next por-
tion of the paper, an assessment of the benefits accruing to the metrop-
olis from professional sports teams and stadiums is analyzed.
TEAMS, STADIUMS, AND METROPOLITAN 
ECONOMIC IMPACT
The experience of a cross-section of cities across the United States
over the past few decades strongly disputes the claim that professional
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sports teams and stadiums provide an economic boost for metropolises.
Baade (1996) found no correlation between the real growth differential
in real per capita personal income for a city experiencing some change
in its professional sports industry and cities experiencing no such
change or having no professional sports presence.  Baade’s analysis
included all cities hosting a team in one of the four major professional
sports (baseball, basketball, football, and hockey), and covered more
than three decades of observations beginning in 1958.  All else equal,
one would expect a professional sports host city to expand economi-
cally if sports does attract more than local interest and dollars.  The fact
that evidence fails to support such a contention requires an explanation
and several come immediately to mind.  
First, the professional sports team may simply be too small to
influence in any meaningful way a large, diverse metropolitan econ-
omy.  For example, in litigation regarding the constitutionality of using
several hundred million dollars of public funds for subsidizing a new
stadium for the NFL’s Tampa Bay Buccaneers to replace a 20-year-old
facility, the author testified as an expert representing those opposed to
public subventions that the team’s revenues ranked below more than 70
other enterprises in that city.  In using an academic context to provide
perspective, Noll and Zimbalist (1997, p. 57) observed that the top ten
universities in the United States received $2.8 billion in federal grant
money in 1994, which was more than the combined revenue of the
NFL and National Hockey League (NHL) or the combined revenue of
MLB and the NBA for that year.  
Second, and perhaps more important, consonant with elementary
budget constraints, spending on professional sports spectating substi-
tutes for time and money that could be spent on other goods or ser-
vices.  To the extent that the fan base is largely indigenous to the
metropolitan area, net spending in the metropolitan area may increase,
decrease, or stay constant even though gross spending on sports
increases significantly.  The distinction between gross and net spending
changes is pivotal in precisely estimating the impact of professional
sports.  Some economic impact studies supporting stadium subsidies
use a gross measure of spending that occurs in conjunction with pro-
fessional sports.  They then purport to capture the indirect impact
through “multiplier analysis.”1   A measure of net spending changes, of
course, requires substantially more data or more sophisticated model-
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ing and accounts in part for the use of estimates of gross spending to
defend stadium subsidies.  Given the paucity of data and the complex
web of financial inflows and outflows that occur as a consequence of
hosting a professional sports team, a reasonable estimate of the team’s
economic contribution likely can be rendered only through comparing
the metropolitan economic landscape before and after the team or sta-
dium.  This after-the-fact audit in estimating the economic impact of
professional sports has been favored by some economists (Noll and
Zimbalist 1997; Baade and Sanderson 1997; Hamilton and Kahn 1997;
Austrian and Rosentraub 1997).
Estimates on gross and net new spending differ substantially.  For
example, in a report estimating the economic impact of the Seattle
Mariners on the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Washing-
ton prepared by Dick Conway & Associates for King County in 1994,
net direct spending as a percentage of gross direct spending was identi-
fied as 44.3 percent for the city and county ($40.4 million/$114.0 mil-
lion for both the city and the state) and 32 percent ($29.1 million/
$114.0) for the state (Conway and Byers 1994).  The difference
between gross and net total direct economic impact are more pro-
nounced because multipliers will compound differences in gross and
net measures of direct economic impacts.  Total net economic impact
as a percentage of total gross economic impact as calculated by Con-
way & Associates was 23.9 percent ($42.9 million/$179.7 million),
38.5 percent ($53.3 million/$138.8 million), and 40.1 percent ($47.7
million/$119.1 million) for the state, county, and city, respectively.  
In relative terms, gross economic impact is likely to be most pro-
nounced in the neighborhood in which the stadium is located.  In mea-
suring the impact professional sports has on economies, a circle could
be drawn from the point where the event actually occurs, and it could
be argued reasonably that the magnitude of the impact, in relative
terms at least, varies inversely with the size of the circle.  Stated some-
what differently, the economic effect is thought to be most pronounced
at “ground-zero,” the exact location of the event.  As the circumference
of the circle expands, the net impact diminishes as the dollars spent on
the sporting event are more completely offset by reduced spending
elsewhere.  Following this budgetary logic as it relates to leisure spend-
ing, the global impact of even the largest sporting events such as the
Summer Olympics approximates zero if an increase in global net
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spending is not induced by the event itself.  This is true because even
those who come from great distances spend time and money at the
Olympics in lieu of time and money they would have spent elsewhere.
The impact locally, therefore, depends on the extent to which spending
and respending occurs by those residing outside the environs where the
event is held, or by local citizens who spend money on the sports event
as opposed to spending discretionary income outside their neighbor-
hood.  Theoretically, a local government might decide to subsidize
sports if the audience is distinctly nonlocal.  In the case of Seattle, Pio-
neer Square (the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located)
might be given an economic boost if those who view the professional
sports events hosted by the stadium are either living outside the com-
munity or are residents who would spend discretionary dollars outside
Pioneer Square.  Within the neighborhood, there are outflows associ-
ated with team and stadium activities, and so even at the local level,
professional sports might fail to provide much of an economic boost.
Later in this chapter, I assess the economic impact the Kingdome has
had on Pioneer Square.  First, however, it is appropriate to identify why
Seattle is worthy of study.  
WHY SEATTLE? 
Seattle typifies the contemporary economic relationship that U.S.
cities hosting major league sports have with their teams, particularly as
it relates to stadiums.  In less than two decades after its construction,
owners of the NFL Seahawks and the MLB Mariners declared the
Kingdome economically obsolete.  In their opinion, the Kingdome
could not compete financially with the new breed of stadiums being
built across the country.  In citing a general shortcoming of multipur-
pose stadiums, the Kingdome’s critics argued that it failed to provide
an environment that encouraged fans to return because it compromised
sight lines for individual sports and otherwise reduced the ambiance
associated with single-sport structures, e.g., Wrigley Field in Chicago.  
Most important, however, was the relative paucity of luxury seat-
ing and other revenue-generating amenities that the owners argued
placed their teams at a distinct financial disadvantage.  Failure to com-
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pete financially limited their ability to compete for free-agent talent
and all but assured mediocrity on the playing field, which would fur-
ther erode the team’s financial standing. Echoing this well-rehearsed
line, the owners contended that Seattle’s parsimony gave them no
choice but to consider the offers of other suitor cities throughout the
United States.  The price to Washingtonians to keep the teams would
be steep: separate stadiums for the Seahawks and Mariners outfitted
with state-of-the-art amenities, including a retractable dome for the
Mariners’ facility.  Even though a majority of the citizens of Seattle
voted “no” in a referendum to build a stadium for the Mariners, new
stadiums are now under construction for the Mariners and Seahawks.
The cost for both facilities will likely eclipse $700 million. 
The apparatus of persuasion employed in trying to convince the
people of Seattle that this was not an egregious example of corporate
welfare included the claim that the stadiums should be considered
investments.  As such, boosters noted that the facilities did not force
painful civic tradeoffs such as financial neglect of schools, streets, and
sewers but would instead generate a stream of revenues that could be
invested in many forms of public infrastructure.  Owners, players, and
fans would not be the only winners, apologists for the stadiums
claimed, citizens of the metropolis and state would benefit as well.
The economic impact studies commissioned by new stadium propo-
nents typically identify thousands of new jobs, more than $100 million
of economic impact, and substantial increases in tax revenues at all lev-
els of government as the outcome of spending on a professional sports
team (Conway and Byers 1994).  In opposition to these data, and as
noted in the previous section, other scholarly studies have debunked
the myth of sports serving as significant catalysts for metropolitan eco-
nomic development.  However, the claim that substantial local or
neighborhood economic development occurs endures.  What has been
the experience of the neighborhood in which the Kingdome is located?
What are the magnitude and pattern of local economic development
inspired by the Kingdome, and what will the new stadiums do for the
environs in which they are located?  The next portion of the paper
addresses these questions.
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THE KINGDOME AND LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
The now-razed Kingdome and site for the two new stadiums is bor-
dered on the north and west by Pioneer Square, a neighborhood of his-
torical significance and of a mixed commercial and residential
character.  Pioneer Square covers a 90-acre area roughly demarcated
by Cherry and Marion Streets on the north, 2nd and 3rd Streets on the
East, the Alaskan Way and the waterfront on the west, and Royal
Brougham Street on the south.   Figures 1 and 2 show the location of
Pioneer Square, including the Kingdome.  Because the stadiums that
will replace the Kingdome are under construction just south of it, this
map can be used to provide a reference for placing the new stadiums in
Seattle.
 Pioneer Square exhibits significant diversity with respect to its
inhabitants and business enterprises.  Missions for the homeless and
condominiums for city officials exist within blocks of one another.
There are 849 housing units in Pioneer Square and roughly 1,200 full-
time residents.  This low ratio of residents to housing units is explained
in part by the high number of units that are identified as single room
occupancy (SROs).  In addition to this low income housing, there are
737 shelter beds, but those who occupy them are not considered full-
time residents.  There are 600 businesses in the business improvement
area (BIA) of Pioneer Square.  Sports bars and jazz clubs share street
space with art galleries and a store that has provided leather goods for
more than a century for people who use horses for more than entertain-
ment.  Fifteen surface parking lots and six parking garages provide for
the parking needs of residents, workers, and visitors to the neighbor-
hood.  The skeletal structures of the new stadiums are rising in what
used to be the far southern parking lot serving the Kingdome.  Prior to
the construction of the new stadiums, the Kingdome parking lots pro-
vided space for approximately 3,600 cars.2  The Kingdome seated
66,400 people for football, and even at the conservative ratio of one
parking space for every four fans, when the stadium was filled to
capacity, 16,600 parking spaces were required.  This stadium parking
shortfall had substantial implications for the neighborhood.  Parking
issues will be discussed extensively in the next section of the paper.
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SOURCE: The Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area; used with permission.
31Figure 2 Seattle Neighborhoods
Seattle Medina
Map courtesy of WHERE Seattle magazine and Northwest Visitors Publications, LLC., 113 First 
Avenue N., #200, Seattle, WA 98109, est. 2000.
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The decision to raze the Kingdome was based in large part on the need
to provide parking for the patrons of the new stadiums.  
The Kingdome originally cost $69 million.  It underwent two reno-
vations in the 1990s.  One of the renovations centered on structural
problems relating to falling ceiling tiles, and the other concentrated on
shoring up a foundation that ostensibly made the facility vulnerable to
earthquakes.  The cost of these two corrective projects exceeded the
$69 million spent to build the Kingdome.  The price for the new stadi-
ums has not been determined because cost overruns are already materi-
alizing.  As mentioned previously, the price for both of them will very
likely exceed $700 million.  Boosters justify these substantial invest-
ments in stadium infrastructure to residents of the Pioneer Square
neighborhood, the city of Seattle, King County, and the state of Wash-
ington.  They note how the substantial amount of economic activity
directly and indirectly related to the Kingdome will benefit all Wash-
ingtonians.  As noted previously, ample empirical evidence negates the
notion that these sizeable investments will positively affect the Seattle
metropolitan and state of Washington economies.  The question
remains, however, did the Pioneer Square neighborhood benefit on bal-
ance from having the Kingdome in its backyard?   And what does the
answer imply about the impact of the new stadiums?
Based on the demographic characteristics,  Pioneer Square has rel-
atively few full-time residents with the financial wherewithal to buy
tickets to professional sporting events.  It follows that the sports events
hosted by the Kingdome attracted the majority of their fans from out-
side Pioneer Square.  If the spending that occurred in conjunction with
sports remained in the Pioneer Square economy, the local financial
boost provided by the stadium would have been substantial.  The key,
of course, is the extent to which the money spent by nonlocal fans was
locally retained and spent again and again in the neighborhood.  Those
who assert that the Kingdome provided a substantial economic boost
for Pioneer Square likely focused their attention on the financial
inflows only.  Casual empiricism supports the assertion that the King-
dome represented a boon to Pioneer Square.  On event days, fans
streamed into the stadium and the environs and spent large amounts of
money.  A precise rendering of the economic impact, however, requires
not only an accurate measure of the dollars spent on sports spectating
and related activities, but a thorough identification of the money out-
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flows that occurred as a consequence of Kingdome events as well.  The
financial leakages from the neighborhood economy may well have
been substantial, and can be broadly categorized as 1) earnings repatri-
ated by owners, players, and other team and stadium personnel to their
residences; 2) the costs incurred to operate the stadium to include the
opportunity costs; and 3) business losses incurred locally as a conse-
quence of peak usage of local resources on game day. Stated somewhat
differently, local business activity may have been crowded out. 
The Pioneer Square neighborhood, to be sure, experienced signifi-
cantly more economic transactions as a consequence of the Kingdome.
Assume for the moment that we think of Pioneer Square as a business
entity and that we identify the Kingdome as a part of Pioneer Square’s
stock of capital.3  From this business, capital stock income flowed
when tickets, baseball paraphernalia, and hot dogs were sold.  The eco-
nomic impact, however, was not equal to gross spending changes any
more than revenues are equal to business profits.  Explicit and implicit
costs arose as a consequence of conducting events at the Kingdome,
and the economic contribution that the Kingdome made to Pioneer
Square was not consonant with gross financial inflows but rather with
net financial inflows to the neighborhood.  Two facts may well serve to
vitiate the economic impact the operation of the Kingdome would at
first blush appear to provide.  First, the stadium may have served as lit-
tle more than an economic conduit through which spending on King-
dome events passed from one set of nonresident hands to another.
Second, the level and urgency of game day activities may have well
strained local resources by crowding out local, normal business activ-
ity.  If either of these effects were pronounced, the neighborhood in
which the stadium was located would have derived far less stimulation
than that suggested by the direct spending that occurred within the sta-
dium’s walls.  
The first point can be illustrated through tracing player salaries. A
stadium does not resemble the corner grocery where the owners live
above the store.  Rather the stadium owners and the stadium employ-
ees, who receive most of the event revenues, are in all probability not
neighborhood residents.  Thus even if fans are not residents and their
spending represents an infusion of funds, the boost provided is short
lived because the nonresident owners and players appropriate that
spending in the form of their profits and wages.  Recent developments
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in professional sports as they relate to stadium construction may well
be making the transfer of funds from one group of nonresidents to
another more complete.  In negotiations with their host cities, teams
have more aggressively and thoroughly exploited the advantage
imparted by an excess demand for teams.  The new breed of stadiums
have evolved into small walled cities that more completely compete
with and capture the economic activity that used to spill out into the
neighborhood.  This stadium/mall concept has been encouraged by the
leagues to help level the financial playing fields of league members.
Furthermore, in their anxiety to attract or retain their teams, cities have
been agreeing to more generous leases that allow teams to appropriate
virtually all of the revenues from ticket sales, concessions, the sale of
sports paraphernalia, parking, stadium advertising, and naming rights.
The quid pro quo for these “sweetheart” leases is that the team dedicate
one revenue source or another to satisfy public demands for a team
“equity” stake in the ballpark project.  Teams readily agree because the
present value of increased stadium earnings exceeds by a significant
amount the present value of the dedicated revenue stream(s).  
Owners have argued that stadiums are necessary to satisfy player
demands for higher salaries.  Suppose for the moment that this owner
rationale is true.  Today for the NBA and NFL, the two sports leagues
that first instituted salary caps, the share of league gross revenues to
which players as a group are entitled by agreement is 57.5 and 63 per-
cent of league gross revenues, respectively.  It follows, therefore, that
significantly more than half of the spending that occurs at the ballpark
finds its way into the pockets of players.  If players do not live in the
community or otherwise do not spend on community goods and ser-
vices, then more than one-half of the revenue that finds its way into the
stadium on game day leaks from the neighborhood.  In the case of
Seattle, it is a virtual certainty that few, if any, of the Seattle Seahawks’
owners and players live in Pioneer Square.  In fact, the market for play-
ers is national, many of them do not establish their primary residences
in the cities in which they play.  Players invest their earnings interna-
tionally and are taxed nationally, therefore, much of what they earn
leaves not only the Pioneer Square economy but the metropolitan econ-
omy as well.
The point made through tracing player salaries applies to taxes
imposed by nonlocal government.  Ignoring for the moment “home
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rule,” how much of the sales tax on sports clothing or excise taxes on
game tickets is retained by the local government?  Much of it becomes
a part of general revenues for the State, County, or City government
imposing the tax, and the extent to which it is returned to the local gov-
ernment depends on institutional arrangement.  The local governments
which provide space for the stadium need to have a hand in shaping
revenue sharing to ensure that their costs for providing stadium space
are covered.  They also must understand the extent to which the sta-
dium and team activities affect general tax revenues at higher the levels
of government from which they derive a share.  Such an analysis is
hardly trivial, but it must be undertaken if the neighborhood is to make
wise decisions with regard to the use of its scarce land resource. 
Opportunity and operating costs, as well as the likelihood that sta-
dium activity will “crowd out” local economic activity, depend on the
character of the neighborhood economy.  Is there a natural synergy
between the stadium and neighborhood, or will expenses mount and
displacement and inactivity occur on a scale that ensures the cost of
hosting the stadium exceeds the expected benefit?  Stadiums require
large tracts of land not only for structures but also for parking if the sta-
dium site or the institutional character of the metropolis or region
makes it accessible primarily by automobile.  Stadiums are not like
shopping malls where economic activity occurs throughout the course
of a day every day.  Stadiums, particularly open-air football stadiums,
spend more time waiting than working.  How the community handles
the “dead time” in the stadium and its attendant areas is critical to its
ability to use the facility to its economic advantage.  Did the Pioneer
Square neighborhood and the Kingdome enjoy a synergistic relation-
ship?  If not, could the lack of synergy have been anticipated by ana-
lyzing the community’s economic character?  To help establish the fit
between the neighborhood and the stadium, a survey was conducted to
assess the impact of the Kingdome on local businesses.  The survey is
appended to the paper, and the results of it are discussed in the next
section of the paper.
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SURVEY RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Compared with other districts in Seattle, the Pioneer Square dis-
trict is more commercially diverse.  Although retail businesses are most
prevalent within the Business Improvement Area (BIA) of the district,
constituting 20.3 percent of all businesses, there are significantly fewer
than in other districts such as Broadway and Roosevelt, which exhibit
retail percentages of 56 and 54 percent, respectively.   Professional ser-
vices, legal services, and art galleries account for 17.6, 13.1, and 9.2
percent, respectively, of all businesses within the Pioneer Square BIA
(krs services, inc. 1998).  Figures 3 and 4 define the Pioneer Square
urban village footprint and the Pioneer Square BIA boundaries, respec-
tively (krs services, inc. 1998). 
  In comparing the character of the businesses in Pioneer Square
with businesses in other districts in Seattle, several attributes distin-
guish the enterprises of Pioneer Square.  The businesses in the King-
dome neighborhood tend to have had shorter histories, are more labor
intensive, exhibit a greater tendency to rent their commercial spaces,
and are smaller.  To wit, 86 percent of the businesses within the BIA
gross less than $1 million per year (krs services, inc. 1998).  All of this
indicates that the businesses of Pioneer Square are more fragile in gen-
eral than enterprises in other districts in Seattle.  Where controversial
urban projects are concerned, this is not inconsonant with national
trends.  Districts that are successful in preventing the development (air-
ports, incinerators, and stadiums) from occurring in their neighborhood
(“not in my backyard”) are generally populated by commercial inter-
ests that are big, established, wealthy, and politically connected.
Downtown stadiums are generally constructed in warehouse or old
railroad yards where land is relatively cheap and political resistance is
relatively feeble.  These fringe downtown areas, however, are often in
the incipient stages of development or have clear alternative uses.  The
concern of residents and local entrepreneurs in such areas is that the
stadium may channel development in directions that are not compatible
with the emerging pattern of growth.  The survey results indicated that
the activities at the Kingdome frustrated rather than contributed to
many business activities in Pioneer Square.  The reason cited in every
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SOURCE: The Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area; used with permission.
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SOURCE: The Pioneer Square Business Improvement Area; used with permission.
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instance of business disruption had to do with parking and general con-
gestion created by events at the Kingdome.  
Table 1 provides the result of the survey conducted in Pioneer
Square June 26 through June 30, 1998.
Table 1 Reported Percentage Changes in Revenues for Businesses in 
















Eating and drinking 
placesc
2 5 2 6
Hotels, motels 1d 1
Art galleries 2 2
Clothing, jewelry and 
other retaile
3 1 1 1






Total 6 7 11 3 8
SOURCE: Author’s survey.
a If the results for the Mariners and Seahawks differed, the convention used was to
report the baseball result for two reasons.  First, many businesses were not open on
Sundays when the Seahawks normally play.  Second, the baseball Mariners had 81
home dates compared to eight regular season games for the Mariners.  There were 10
cases in which businesses were open on Sunday and reported different impacts
(degree, not direction) for the Mariners and Seahawks.
b Percentage changes are reported to insure autonomy for the businesses that partici-
pated in the survey.
c In general, the eating and drinking establishments closest to the Kingdome benefited
most from its operation.  The impact, in general, diminished with each additional
block of distance.
d Hotel located outside the Pioneer Square footprint.
e Those retail outlets that reported an increase in sales were both in the business of sell-
ing sports paraphernalia.
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Several conclusions can be drawn based on the survey and inter-
views of businesses in the Pioneer Square BIA.  First, bars that have a
sports theme and a location adjacent to the Kingdome derived substan-
tial benefits.  Sports bars/restaurants in the immediate vicinity of the
Kingdome reported as much as an 800 percent increase in revenues
from Mariners’ games on weekdays and an increase in business by
1700 percent from weekend Mariners games.  Second, the increase in
the bar/restaurant business generally was inversely related to the estab-
lishment’s distance from the Kingdome.  Unless the bar had a particu-
larly compelling sports identity, three or four blocks walking distance
from the stadium was sufficient to eliminate most of the positive eco-
nomic impact cited by bars a block or less away.  Proximity, however,
is no guarantee of success.  If the bar/restaurant was not on a pedestrian
thoroughfare, the impact was also muted.  To cite an example, one bar/
restaurant a block and one-half from the stadium, but removed from
the constellation of bars frequented by fans after a game, attempted to
build a clientele with sports promotions and themes with no success.
The bar has changed hands four times in the past few years due to a
lack of business.  Third, the success of the sports bar/restaurant is
highly sensitive to the success of the teams.  Not only does a winning
team attract more fans to the stadium, but apparently fans supporting
mediocre or losing teams are in no mood to celebrate.  Several sports
bars that gushed about the positive impact of the Mariners and Sea-
hawks sounded a much more sober note in describing the Mariners
impact on business in 1998 and other years in which the teams did not
compete for a championship.
Other businesses did not share the enthusiasm or the success of the
sports bar entrepreneurs for the Kingdome and its teams.  Ethnic res-
taurants, art galleries, professional services, legal services, and most
retail outlets reported a decline in business generally in the neighbor-
hood of 25 percent or less.  Some professional service establishments,
including law offices, have considered changing their location because
of the difficulties they encounter meeting clients on game days.  The
culprit cited by all firms adversely affected by the Kingdome was inad-
equate parking.4  As noted previously, the Kingdome parking lots were
insufficient to meet the peak traffic flow during stadium events.  Auto-
mobiles spilled into the neighborhood crowding out normal business
activity by using scarce parking spaces.  If local spending that occurs
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in conjunction with the stadium events equaled or exceeded local
spending that would occur in the absence of the stadium events, then
on balance the local economy would gain.  The means for measuring
the net spending change are inadequate, but it is clear that the stadium
activity did channel business into certain realms and away from others
and did create the need for additional parking.
The demand for parking for peak neighborhood activity connected
with stadium events creates a dilemma for the community.  On one
hand, building more parking structures or surface lots minimized the
economic disruption caused by the excess demand for parking.  On the
other hand, using scarce land to accommodate peak parking demand
for a few hours of approximately one hundred days would change the
character of the neighborhood.  Also, providing for more parking
would likely create negative externalities and “public goods” issues
that would be esthetic as well as economic in nature.  Parking lots are
strictly utilitarian.  They are not attractive structures and have no par-
ticular architectural character.   
A second option is to price the parking to discourage the quantity
of it demanded.  One of the bitterest complaints relating to the Pioneer
Square parking problems is the increase in parking prices on game day.
Participants in the survey reported that lot parking rates double on
game or event days and that “meter maids” get more aggressive, thus
raising the implicit parking price.  The parking problem could be exac-
erbated further because two stadiums will replace the Kingdome.  No
agreement has been reached to prohibit the use of the two stadiums on
the same day.  If events are held on the same day and are highly
attended, then the parking problem could escalate dramatically.
Despite what is now the north parking lot will be used for housing,
government has promised that the number of parking spaces in the Pio-
neer Square area will be increased through the construction of at least
one new tiered parking lot.  Of course, tiered parking structures are far
more expensive than surface lots, and egress from them is slower.
The parking problem can be mitigated if the public opts for using
the area public transit.  Union Station (rail) and the International Dis-
trict Station for the International Transit Tunnel (bus) are a few blocks
northeast of the dome.  The Pioneer Square Station of the Downtown
Transit Tunnel is only a few blocks further away from the Kingdome.
Closing some streets to parking on game day and raising parking prices
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is designed, in part, to encourage transportation to the stadium using
some means other than automobiles.  It should be noted that the use of
public transportation requires a significant cultural modification.  It is
arguable that people in the western part of the United States are unusu-
ally partial to automobile transit and display a reluctance to use public
transportation.  How much inconvenience or additional expense will be
required to motivate them to opt for alternative transportation?  That
question is being debated by people not only in Seattle but throughout
the West and the entire United States.  Because 50 percent of the busi-
nesses inside the BIA and 90 percent of the businesses ringing the BIA
indicated that transportation was critical to their business (krs services,
inc., 1998), the automobile transportation problem as it relates to Pio-
neer Square has to be resolved.  Parking validation programs for resi-
dents and business customers, shuttle buses for neighborhood
employees, and park and ride (satellite parking) programs are being
seriously considered.
In summary, the results of our survey indicated that less than one-
third of the businesses located in Pioneer Square reported revenue
increases attributable to the Kingdome.  Aside from the parking lot
business, bars and restaurants with a sports identity benefited, as did
Pioneer Square hotels. In general, however, most businesses located in
Pioneer Square (retail, professional services, legal services, and art gal-
leries) reported that their revenues either remained constant or suffered
as a consequence of the Kingdome.  This finding echoes results
reported in the recent survey conducted by krs services, inc.  On page
13 of their July 24, 1998 study, the firm reported:
It is interesting to note that lack of dependence by the
majority of Pioneer Square businesses on tourists,
spectators at sporting/Kingdome events and participants in
the First Thursday or gallery activities . . .
It is also interesting that, according to those who
participated in the survey, there appears to be as much
business reliance on customers attending First Thursday or
patronizing art galleries as there are spectators attending
sporting events or other activities at the Kingdome.
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Reportedly, the Kingdome adversely affects certain businesses in
Pioneer Square because of its peak use of key community resources,
most notably parking, during stadium events.  In general, the stadium’s
overall economic impact on the neighborhood was uncertain.  There-
fore, with any new urban stadium, overall economic activity could
increase, remain constant, or decrease.  What is clear is that city gov-
ernments cannot assume that the influx of spectators into a neighbor-
hood for a stadium event will translate into increased economic activity
to a degree commensurate with the number of visitors.  Indeed, in iden-
tifying the reasons why a stadium may not induce an expansion of the
metropolitan economy, one may not have to look any further than the
neighborhood in which the stadium is located.  In the neighborhood,
the substitution effects, which negate the impact of fan spending in
conjunction with the sporting events, are most apparent.  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There appears to be growing agreement that professional sports
teams and stadiums have little if any economic impact on their host cit-
ies.  The lack of economic impact is explained by simple budgetary
realities.  If the fans attending the sporting events are indigenous to the
city hosting the event, then the time and money they spend spectating
at sporting events is vitiated by reduced spending elsewhere within the
metropolitan area.  The impact on the local or neighborhood economy
in which the stadium is located is less clear.  The influx of nonresidents
on game or event day suggests substantial economic impact.  Does
more careful empirical analysis confirm casual observation?  Does the
downtown benefit from the construction of a sports stadium?  
The evidence from Seattle is decidedly mixed.  Clearly the stadium
channels economic activity in the direction of businesses that have a
connection to sports.  Stadium bars and restaurants and retail outlets
selling sports paraphernalia benefit.  Many other businesses, particu-
larly those that do not appeal to sports fans, lose business.  This occurs
as a consequence of peak use of shared community resources on event
day; parking and sidewalk space are the most obvious examples.  Cus-
tomers that ordinarily would patronize local businesses do not on event
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day because the cost and inconvenience of doing so increases.  Routine
or normal business, therefore, is crowded out on a scale that may well
offset any neighborhood gains.  Unless the excess demand for key local
resources is somehow mitigated, many other commercial activities in
the neighborhood are destined to decline.
The policy implications are clear.  Whether the stadium contributes
meaningfully to the local economy depends on the nature of that econ-
omy and its ability to minimize the disruption caused by peak stadium
traffic.  This requires careful planning and a willingness on the part of
professional sports teams to be good citizens.  The political power that
professional sports teams currently wield forces neighborhood busi-
nesses and residents to shoulder a disproportionate share of the risks
and inconvenience associated with the influx of fans on game days.
Local residents, business employees, and other business patrons have
to be given parking priorities.  Remote parking and an emphasis on
public transportation are essential to maintaining neighborhood eco-
nomic vitality.    
In addition to parking concessions, owners of professional sports
teams need to share the commerce associated with sports spectating.
The modern stadium doubles as a shopping mall complete with food
courts whose operation serves to minimize the neighborhood economic
impact.  The fact that souvenir venders are prohibited from operating
too close to some new stadiums in the U.S. is one overt manifestation
of excessive team influence and a lack of citizenship.
Legislators have been sensitive to the demise of urban America for
a variety of reasons, and, as a consequence, initiatives designed to reju-
venate downtowns have enjoyed some support at the state and federal
levels.  There are what economists would identify as externality issues
associated with urban blight, and it could be argued that revitalizing
downtowns generates benefits that spill beyond the urban core.  If this
is so, nonlocal public subsidies for downtown redevelopment may have
merit. Before stadiums can be used to rejuvenate the downtown, it
must be determined that they represent the best use of that land.  Park-
ing and the nature of economic development that sports fosters are fac-
tors that have to be weighed in those land-use decisions.  Professional
sports leagues operate as unregulated monopolies, and until that issue
is addressed, poor decisions with regard to the location and operation
of stadiums will continue to occur.  The most important policy implica-
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tion is to revamp the structure of professional sports leagues to ensure
that the greatest good for the greatest number is ensured.
Notes
1. Direct expenditures are “multiplied” by a number that represents the respending
of dollars spent as a consequence of the sports event.  For example, the waiters at
a restaurant that attracts fans after the game receives tips that are in turn spent by
the waiter on goods and services provided by the local economy.  For an example
of an analysis that uses gross expenditures see Shils (1989).
2. With the construction of the baseball stadium, approximately 1,200 of those park-
ing spots have been eliminated in the south parking lot.  For an event that attracts
a capacity crowd, the 2,400 available stadium parking spaces implies there are 27
fans for each parking space.  Given the use of automobiles by fans, the industry
standard has been three or four fans for each parking space.
3. Representing the neighborhood as a business admittedly captures only a portion
of a community’s character and quality of life, but such a representation provides
some useful insights.
4. In the July 24, 1998 survey conducted by krs services, inc., businesses gave park-
ing the highest priority in improving Pioneer Square.  Parking, however, is not a
problem unique to Pioneer Square.  In six other recently surveyed Seattle business





 Survey of the Effects the Kingdome
 on Commercial Activity in Seattle
Note to the participant: Your responses to this survey will be kept strictly
confidential.  Individual responses will not be reported separately.  The data a
business provides will be reported only as part of an overall result in which
variables such as the change in revenues will be represented as percent chang-
es.
1. Business or firm name_________________________________________
2. Location of business __________________________________________ 
3. Proximity to Kingdome__________walking minutes____________miles
4. Type of business ____________________________________________ 
(Office use only: SIC code =         ).
5. Business structure: ___ Corporate ___Franchise ___ Sole proprietorship
___ Locally owned ___ Nationally owned
6.  On-street parking ___Yes ___No
Parking on street is metered ___Yes ___No
___ Distance to nearest parking garage/lot 
___ Proximity to public transportation.
7. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Mariners
___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%
___ stays the same
8. Revenue generated by your business on game day/night for the Seahawks
 ___ increases by more than 25% ___ increases by less than 25%
___ decreases by more than 25% ___ decreases by less than 25%
___ stays the same
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9. If revenue decreases on game day it is because of (rank on a scale of 0–5,
where 0 represents no effect and 5 represents a significant effect):
___ inadequate parking ___ competition from stadium amenities
___ general stadium congestion ___  behavior of those who attend games.
10. Revenue Data:
Typical revenue from the business: ___ Weekday ___Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Mariners’ game:
___ Weekday ___  Weekend
Typical revenue from the business during a Seahawks’ game:
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